Decision
Mr. X and Health Service Executive
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-148945-Q7H2B3
Published on
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-148945-Q7H2B3
Published on
Whether the HSE was justified in refusing access to records relating to the applicant, and in particular to records regarding complaints made against him
10 July 2025
In an undated FOI request, received by the HSE on 24 October 2023, the applicant (an HSE employee) sought access to records relating to him. In particular, he requested access to records and correspondence relating to two workplace complaints that had been made against him in 2022, and actions taken on foot of the complaints. The applicant specified that he sought access to records and correspondence relating to the referral of complaints to the HSE’s human resources National Investigations Unit and their subsequent referral back to a local human resources department.
It appears that on or around 14 December 2023, the HSE advised the applicant that it required additional time in which to process his request, although a copy of this correspondence was not provided to this Office. In a decision dated 4 March 2024, the HSE part-granted the applicant’s request. The schedule of records provided by the HSE with its initial decision identified 81 records relevant to the request, across four categories (A to D). The HSE released 28 records in full to the applicant, and partially released a further 29 records, with material redacted pursuant to section 37 of the FOI Act. The HSE withheld in full the remaining records, relying on sections 37 and 30(1) of the FOI Act as a basis for doing so, except for three of the fully withheld records which it stated were not relevant to the request (and therefore outside the scope of the request). However, it should be noted that there appears to have been some degree of confusion regarding the manner in which the records were scheduled, and this is a matter I address further below.
It would appear that, in the period between making his original request and the HSE issuing its decision, the applicant submitted a request on 11 January 2024 for an internal review of what he considered the effective refusal of his request by the HSE. Although the precise sequence of events is somewhat unclear on the basis of the information available to this Office, in any case the HSE issued an internal review decision on 19 March, wherein it affirmed its original decision. On 13 May 2024, the applicant applied to this Office for a review of the HSE’s decision.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to correspondence exchanged between the parties, the applicant’s comments in his application for review and to the submissions made by the HSE in support of its decision. I have also had regard to the contents of the records concerned. I have decided to conclude this review by way of a formal, binding decision.
This review is solely concerned with whether the HSE was justified, under sections 37 and 30(1) of the FOI Act, in refusing access in whole or part to the records sought by the applicant.
As outlined above, the precise sequence of events in this FOI request remains somewhat unclear. In particular, it is not entirely apparent to me why the HSE issued its original decision almost two months after it received an internal review request, and an internal review decision two weeks after that. In any case, it would appear that the HSE did not issue its original decision within the relevant time period provided for in the FOI Act. It is incumbent on me to remind the HSE that the FOI Act is clear on the relevant timeframes within which decisions on FOI requests should issue, and to urge it to take steps to ensure it is in a position to meet these deadlines in future.
In addition, the initial decision letter that issued to the applicant on 4 March 2024 does not contain any particulars regarding the provisions of the FOI Act that the HSE relied on, while the internal review decision letter sets out the details of section 30(1), but not section 37. I must remind the HSE that under section 13(2)(d) of the FOI Act, where a public body refuses an FOI request in whole or part, it is required to provide the reasons for such refusal, as well as the provision(s) under the FOI Act under which it is refused and the findings on any material issues relevant to the decision and particulars of any matter relating to the public interest which were taken into consideration for the purposes of the decision.
I also wish to note that release of records under FOI is generally understood to have the same effect as disclosing it "to the world at large". This is because there are no restrictions placed on the use to which information released under FOI may subsequently be put.
Finally, it is important to note that a review by this Office is considered to be “de novo", which means that in this case, it is based on the circumstances and the law as they pertain at the time of the decision and is not confined to the basis upon which the FOI body reached its decision.
As outlined above, the scheduling of the records by the HSE in this case was somewhat unclear. The HSE identified four categories of records that fell within the scope of the applicant’s FOI request, and labelled these categories A-D. The HSE scheduled these by page number, but separated them into discrete records. For the purposes of this review, I will refer to the records at issue by Category and record number, for example “Category A, record 1”, and so on.
The HSE initially scheduled 81 records across the four categories: 31 Category A records (comprising 177 pages in total), 38 category B records (comprising 225 pages in total), 11 category C records (made up of 34 pages in total), and 1 category D record (of 121 pages). However, in the course of this review, the HSE indicated that it had re-examined the records at issue and had concluded that seven records from category A that it had previously withheld in full could be fully released to the applicant, while Category, A record 7, which it had initially withheld in full, could be part-granted.
In addition, on foot of its re-examination of the records, the HSE re-scheduled the records that comprised Category D. Specifically, the material comprising Category D, which was originally scheduled as one record made up of 121 pages, and which was withheld in full, was divided by the HSE into 93 individual records (making a total of 174 records that were scheduled in response to the FOI request). Of these 93, it released 79 in full to the applicant, and five in part, with redactions made pursuant to sections 37 and 30(1) of the FOI Act. In addition, the HSE withheld Category D, record 74 (page 48a) in part, with material redacted on the basis that it did not relate to the subject matter of the applicant’s FOI request.
The HSE withheld the remaining nine Category D records in full pursuant to sections 37 and 30(1) of the FOI Act.
Furthermore, following of its re-examination of the relevant records, the HSE indicated that it considered that additional exemptions provided for by the FOI Act applied to certain of the records. In particular, in relation to Category A, in addition to its initial reliance on section 37 of the FOI Act, it stated that it also considered that section 30(1) applied to records 3, 4-6, 11, 13 and 15. The HSE applied the same reasoning to Category B, records 1, 14, 23, 27, 29, 31 and 33. Moreover, the HSE indicated that its original schedule contained errors in relation to certain records. In relation to Category B, record 28, the HSE stated that this had been incorrectly scheduled as having been released in full to the applicant, and clarified that in fact it was withheld in full under sections 37 and 30(1)(a). Similarly, in respect of Category B, record 32, the HSE stated that this had been incorrectly scheduled as having been released in full when, in fact, it was withheld in part, with redactions made to the second page of the record under sections 37 and 30(1)(a). In addition, the HSE indicated that parts of Category A, record 31 (specifically, pages 142-177 of record 31), which had previously been withheld in its entirety, could be released. Similarly, the HSE indicated that Category A, records 19 and 28, which had previously been withheld in full, could be released in their entirety. I also wish to note that pages 34 and 35 of Category A, record 11 were not initially provided to this Office, although they were scheduled. I followed up on this point with the HSE, which subsequently provided copies of the relevant pages.
Following the HSE’s re-examination and re-scheduling of the records, and its release of certain material, the records that remain to be examined as part of this review are as follows:
• Category A:
o withheld in full – records 4-5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19-20, 22, 24-25 and 27-29
o withheld in part – records 2, 6, 9, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26, and 30-31
• Category B:
o withheld in full – records 1, 14, 23, 27-28, 31 and 33
o withheld in part – records 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 25, 29, 32, 35 and 37
• Category C:
o withheld in full – record 5
o withheld in part – records 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10
• Category D:
o withheld in full – records 5, 7, 10, 25, 47, 60, 81, 84 and 89
o withheld in part – records 2-3, 9, 46 and 74.
The HSE withheld from release each of the above records in whole or part under either sections 37 and/or 30(1) of the FOI Act, with the exception of Category A, records 24 and 27, and Category C, record 5, which were withheld in full on the basis that they were outside the scope of the FOI request, and Category D record 74, which was partly withheld on the same basis. I have examined these four records and accept the HSE’s contention that the withheld material is not within the scope of the applicant’s FOI request. Furthermore, I am satisfied that page 34 of Category A, record 11 is similarly outside scope. Accordingly, no further consideration of these records is necessary.
Broadly speaking, the records at issue comprise internal HSE email communications, notes of telephone calls, and notifications of complaints. There are also a number of records that comprise letters internal to the HSE. Finally a number of the other records comprise guidance notes, screening forms, checklists, assessment forms, toolkits and supporting materials to aid the investigation of complaints.
As the HSE cited section 37 in respect of the vast majority of the records at issue, I propose to examine the applicability of this provision of the FOI Act at the outset. The HSE relied on section 37(1) to withhold in full or part all of the records, with the exception of Category A, record 31 and Category D, record 89. However, in the case of Category A, record 31 (pages 136-141), having examined the record I am satisfied that it is appropriate to also examine it under section 37(1), albeit that the HSE did not seek to rely on that provision of the FOI Act in respect of the record. In addition, the HSE also argued that section 37(7) applied to Category A, records 3-4, 6, 11 and 20; Category B, records 1, 14, 21, 23, 27, 29, 31 and 33; and to Category D, records 7, 10, 25, 47, 60 and 84.
Section 37(1) provides that, subject to the other provisions of the section, an FOI body shall refuse to grant a request if access to the record concerned would involve the disclosure of personal information relating to third parties. The effect of section 37(1) is that, generally speaking, access to a record shall be refused if it would involve the disclosure of personal information relating to individual(s) other than the requester, unless one of the other relevant provisions of section 37 applies. This does not apply where the information involved relates to the requester (section 37(2)(a) refers). However, section 37(7) provides that, notwithstanding section 37(2)(a), an FOI body shall refuse to grant a request if access to the record concerned would, in addition to involving the disclosure of personal information relating to the requester, also involve the disclosure of personal information relating to an individual or individuals other than the requester (commonly known as joint personal information).
Section 2 of the FOI Act defines personal information as information about an identifiable individual that either (a) would ordinarily be known only to the individual or to members of his/her family or to his/her friends, or (b) is held by an FOI body on the understanding that it would be treated by the FOI body as confidential. Section 2 goes on to specify 14 categories of information which, without prejudice to the generality of the above definition, constitute personal information, including (iii) information relating to the employment or employment history of the individual, (v) information relating to the individual in a record falling within section 11(6)(a) i.e. personnel records of staff of FOI bodies, and (xiv) the views or opinions of another person about the individual.
Certain information is excluded from the definition of personal information. Where the individual holds or held a position as a member of the staff of an FOI body, the definition does not include his or her name, or information relating to the position, the functions of the position, the terms upon and subject to which the individual holds or held that position, or anything written or recorded in any form by the individual in the course of and for the purpose of the performance of his or her functions (Paragraph I refers). The exclusion at Paragraph I does not exclude all information relating to staff members. The exclusion is intended, in essence, to ensure that section 37 cannot be used to exempt the identity of a public servant in the context of the particular position held or any records created by the staff member while carrying out his or her official functions, or information relating to the terms, conditions and functions of positions. The exclusion does not deprive public servants of the right to privacy generally.
I have examined the records and find as follows in relation to section 37. Firstly, while (as outlined above) information relating to staff members of public bodies in the performance of their official functions is not considered to be personal information, I would accept that much of the information in the records at issue contain information that relates to certain individuals employed by the HSE, not in the context of the performance of their formal functions, but rather to their competence or ability. I am satisfied, therefore, that such records fall within the meaning of a personnel record under section 11(6)(a) of the FOI Act. Furthermore, I am also satisfied that certain information in the records relates to the employment or employment history of individuals, and that certain records also contain the views or opinions of another person about individuals. It seems clear to me, therefore, that a significant number of the records at issue contain information which, at a minimum, falls within points (iii), (v) and (xiv) of the 14 categories of information set out in section 2 of the FOI Act which specifically constitute personal information, and which is not captured by the exclusion at Paragraph (I) of that definition. It should be noted that it would appear that the applicant has some knowledge of the contents of the records – for example, from his FOI request it is clear that he is aware of the identity of a party who has made a complaint against him. However, as outlined above I must regard the release of records under the FOI Act as, effectively, release to the world at large. In these circumstances, I am satisfied – with a small number of exceptions that I discuss below – that the release of the information in the records that were withheld either in whole or part would involve the disclosure of personal information of individuals other than the applicant. This the case in circumstances where I am satisfied that the records contain either the personal information of third parties alone (such as to bring the records within the scope of section 37(1) of the FOI Act), or the joint personal information of both the applicant and another party, or parties (such as to bring the records within the scope of section 37(7) of the FOI Act).
The exceptions to my finding above relate to records which seem to me to either contain no information at all that could be considered personal, or which contain only a minimal amount of personal information. I make this finding in respect of the following Category A records:
• record 7 – page 26 is a letter from the HSE’s Business Manager (HR) to the Executive Clinical Director of its Mental Health Services. This record does not contain personal information, save for a reference to an individual in the first line of the main body of the letter (which I accept is personal information and subject to section 37(1) of the FOI Act)
• record 11 – pages 38-40 are forms relating to the HSE’s complaints process which do not contain personal information.
In relation to the information in the records that I have identified above as either personal to individuals other than the applicant, or as joint personal information, the matter does not end there as 37(1) is subject to the other provisions of section 37, while section 37(7) is subject to section 37(2)(b) to (e), section 37(5) and 37(8). Section 37(2) provides that section 37(1) does not apply in certain circumstances. I am satisfied that no such circumstances arise in this case and that section 37(2) does not, therefore, apply.
Section 37(5) provides that a request that would fall to be refused under section 37(1) may still be granted where, on balance (a) the public interest that the request should be granted outweighs the right to privacy of the individual to whom the information relates, or (b) the grant of the request would benefit the person to whom the information relates. I am satisfied that section 37(5)(b) of the Act does not apply.
Before I consider the applicability of section 37(5)(a), there are a number of important points to note. First, section 13(4) provides that, subject to the legislation, in deciding whether to grant or refuse an FOI request, any reason that the requester gives for the request and any belief or opinion of the FOI body as to the reasons for the request shall be disregarded. In relation to the question of the public interest, this means that I cannot have regard to the applicant's motives for seeking access to the records at issue, except in so far as those motives reflect, or overlap with, what might be regarded as true public interest factors in favour of release of the records, i.e. insofar as the concerns raised in relation to the request may also be matters of general concern to the wider public.
Secondly, it is important to note that the release of records under the FOI Act must be regarded, in effect, as release to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which a record released under the Act can be put. With certain limited exceptions provided for under the legislation, such as under sections 37(2)(a) and 37(8) (which I consider below), FOI is not about granting access to information to particular individuals only and as noted above, a requester's reasons for making a request are generally not of relevance. Thus, records are not released under FOI for any limited or restricted purpose.
All of this means that in considering whether a right of access exists to records under section 37(5)(a) of the Act, any decision to grant access would be on the basis that there is an overriding public interest in the release of the records effectively to the world at large that outweighs the privacy rights of the third-party individuals concerned.
In considering where the balance of the public interest lies in this case, I have had regard to section 11(3) which provides that in performing any functions under the FOI Act, an FOI body must have regard to, among other things, the need to achieve greater openness in the activities of FOI bodies and to promote adherence by them to the principles of transparency in government and public affairs and the need to strengthen the accountability and improve the quality of decision making of FOI bodies. However, in doing so, I have also had regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Information Commissioner & Ors [2020] IESC 57 (“the Enet case”). In that case, the Supreme Court found that a general principle of openness does not suffice to direct release of records in the public interest and “there must be a sufficiently specific, cogent and fact-based reason to tip the balance in favour of disclosure”. Although the Court’s comments were made in cases involving confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, I consider them to be relevant to the consideration of public interest tests generally.
In its submissions on section 37(5)(a), the HSE identified a number of public interest factors both for and against the release of the personal information at issue. In terms of public interest factors in favour of release, the HSE noted the public interest in members of the public exercising their right of access under the FOI Act, the public interest in ensuring openness and accountability, and the public interest in knowing what information is held by a public body. Against this, it identified as public interest factors favouring the withholding of the information the public interest in protecting the right to privacy of individuals, including employees who raise concerns or complaints about colleagues, the public interest in ensuring that personal information imparted by employees to the HSE remains confidential, and the public interest in employees being able to communicate in confidence with their employer in relation to personal and sensitive matters and to raise concerns in regarding workplace matters without fear of disclosure and identification to the public at large.
In the applicant’s comments in his request to this Office for an appeal of the HSE’s decision on his FOI request, he expressed what I consider to essentially be a private interest in the release of the information. However, I would also accept that the applicant’s reasons for seeking access to the records are reflective of a public interest in ensuring that public bodies such as the HSE process workplace complaints in a fair and objective manner.
This being said, the FOI Act recognises the public interest in the protection of the right to privacy both in the language of section 37 and the Long Title to the FOI Act (which makes clear that the release of records under FOI must be consistent with the right to privacy). It is also worth noting that the right to privacy has a constitutional dimension, as one of the unenumerated personal rights under the Constitution. Privacy rights will therefore be set aside only where the public interest served by granting the request (and breaching those rights) is sufficiently strong to outweigh the public interest in protecting privacy. Moreover, even where an overriding public interest in granting the request exists, there is a discretionary element to the application of section 37(5)(a).
While I accept that the release of the records at issue would serve to somewhat enhance transparency around the manner in which the HSE processes workplace complaints, it seems to me that the degree of enhancement would be quite limited. On the other hand, some of the information at issue is of an inherently sensitive and private nature, and even the remaining information that might not be so characterised is nonetheless personal for the purposes of the FOI Act. Furthermore, as noted above I must regard its release as being effectively, or at least potentially, to the world at large. In the circumstances, I do not accept that the public interest in releasing the personal information in the records outweighs, on balance, the privacy rights of the individuals to which it relates. I find, therefore, that section 37(5)(a) does not apply.
Accordingly, I find that the HSE was justified in refusing access, under section 37(1) of the Act, in conjunction with section 37(7), to the information in the records that I have identified as comprising personal information.
In those circumstances, I am not required to examine the extent to which section 30(1)(a) of the FOI Act might also apply to the same information. The HSE also relied on section 30(1)(a) to withhold the portion of Category A, record 11 which I have found not to be exempt under section 37(1), and it remains for me to examine the extent to which it was justified in doing so.
As noted above, the HSE relied on section 30(1)(a) of the FOI Act to withhold part of Category A, record 11 (pages 38-40). It also cited section 30(1)(a) as a basis to withhold Category D, record 89 in full. Section 30(1)(a) provides that an FOI body may refuse to grant an FOI request if access to the record concerned could, in the body’s opinion, reasonably be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of tests, examinations, investigations, inquiries or audits conducted by or on behalf of an FOI body or the procedures or methods employed for the conduct thereof. Where an FOI body seeks to rely on section 30(1)(a), it should firstly identify the potential harm in relation to the relevant function specified in paragraph (a) that might arise from disclosure, and secondly, having identified that harm, consider the reasonableness of any expectation that the harm will occur.
In its submissions on section 30(1)(a), the HSE argued that this provision of the FOI Act applied to the material at issue on the basis that it concerned an ongoing internal Dignity at Work investigation. The HSE stated that the release of such information relating to the investigation could reasonably be expected to prejudice its effectiveness. It outlined that one of the core principles of the Dignity at Work Policy related to the level of confidentiality required of all parties involved in the process. The HSE noted that its Dignity at Work policy states that, "All parties to the complaint should be reminded of the need to maintain confidentiality at this stage and throughout the process to the greatest extent possible consistent with the requirements of fair procedures", and moreover that, "Confidentiality will be maintained throughout the investigation to the greatest extent consistent with the requirements of a fair investigation...". The HSE stated that the same policy states elsewhere that, "Confidentiality of all parties will be maintained to the maximum extent possible, taking into account the requirements of natural justice and fair procedures”, and that, "Any party who participates in the investigation process will be required to respect the privacy of the parties involved by refraining from discussing the matter with other work colleagues or persons outside the organisation".
The HSE stated that its Dignity at Work policy was aimed at providing a safe working environment for all employees in the public health service. It said the policy recognises that all employees have a right to be treated with dignity and respect, and that it is a key tool in the HSE’s approach to its statutory health and safety responsibilities with regard to preventing and managing risks associated with bullying, harassment and sexual harassment. The HSE argued that the relevant parties in this case had an expectation that information imparted to HSE management under the Dignity at Work process would be managed in the strictest confidence, in line with the policy, and would be not released potentially to the world at large.
The HSE went on to note that, as part of the process for managing a complaint, an appropriate manager is identified to act as a nominated person to deal with the complaint and that, under the Dignity at Work policy, the party being investigated is given a copy of the written complaint and invited to respond to the allegation(s) in writing. A copy of any such response would then be forwarded to the complainant. The complainant and the respondent are advised of the aims and objectives of the formal process, the procedures and approximate expected timeframe involved, and the possible outcomes. Throughout the process, the HSE stated that the parties are given a copy of all relevant documentation, including the policy, the terms of reference, minutes/records of meetings and signed witness statements, if applicable. The HSE stated that, in this case, it was satisfied that the applicant had been, or will be in due course, provided with all relevant records relating to the complaint made against him. It argued that the release of the requested records under FOI could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of the Dignity at Work process.
In addition, the HSE argued that the release of the information at issue, which it stated was part of an agreed confidential process, could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of future Dignity at Work investigations. It argued that, if the asserted confidentiality of the information provided during an investigation could not be guaranteed, the effect would be to reduce the willingness of staff to fully and openly participate in such investigations in future.
I have considered these arguments of the HSE in the context of the records at issue and find as follows. I firstly accept that the HSE has successfully identified a relevant function for the purposes of section 30(1)(a), namely the investigation of the specific complaint at issue, as well as the investigation of any similar complaints in the future. Furthermore, I am quite willing to accept the HSE’s argument that, as a general proposition, the release under FOI of material provided on a confidential basis by parties to a complaint under the HSE’s Dignity at Work policy might reasonably be expected to adversely affect not only the investigation at hand, but also future investigations, for the reasons it has put forward and which I have outlined above.
However, I am less satisfied that the disclosure of the specific contents of the records at issue could reasonably be expected to have this effect. In relation to the relevant pages of Category A, record 11, it does not seem to me that any of the material comprises confidential information provided by either party to the complaint. Rather, the withheld pages are standard forms either for the guidance of, or completion by, the assigned investigator. It is worth noting that, while pages 39 and 40 are to be completed by the investigator, the copy of page 40 is blank (that is to say, has not been completed), while the only information on page 39 is the name and signature of the investigator and the date of signing. I am not satisfied that the release of this material could reasonably be expected to either prejudice the conduct of the investigation at hand, or to deter parties to any future investigation from providing information to the HSE. This is the case in circumstances where none of the material discloses information provided by any of the parties to the complaint.
The same finding applies to much of Category D, record 89. For instance, pages 59a-59h similarly seem to me to comprise material for the guidance of, or completion by, the investigator. It is worth noting again that those pages that are intended to be completed by the investigator have not been completed. I make the same finding in relation to these pages that I have made above in relation to pages 38-40 of Category A, record 11.
Pages 60a-60c of Category D, record 89 comprise the draft terms of reference of the HSE’s Dignity at Work policy, while pages 61a-61f comprise a template checklist for use by Human Resources Investigators. Pages 62a-62D are excerpts from a specified court case, which appears to be a guidance/training resource for investigators. Page 63 is a template letter for the assistance of complaint investigators and page 64a-64b is further guidance material. Pages 65a-65b make up an additional template checklist for use by investigators. As with my finding above, I cannot envisage a manner in which the release of any of this material might reasonably be expected to prejudice either the specific investigation at hand, or future investigations. This material is solely comprised of guidance, checklists and/or templates for use by an investigator, and any such checklists have not been completed. It does not seem to me to be realistic to suggest that the release of this material could lead to the harms to the investigation process asserted by the HSE.
Page 66 of Category D, record 89 is a memo of a phone call made in the context of the investigation, which contains minimal details. Pages 67a-68b are internal HSE emails that are concerned with the general administration of the complaint, and do not appear to me to reveal any details provided by either party to the matter. Again, this information seems to me to be entirely routine and uncontroversial, and I find it very difficult to accept that the release of any of it could reasonably be expected to give rise to the harms to the investigation process that the HSE has argued would follow as a result.
For the avoidance of any doubt, although the HSE did not make this argument explicitly, I have also considered whether the release of the material which was withheld under section 30(1)(a) could be reasonably expected to prejudice the conduct of any future investigations of complaints under the HSE’s Dignity at Work policy by, for example, revealing information about the complaints investigation process to respondents that might allow them to circumvent or undermine such investigations, and I am satisfied that the none of the information is of a kind that would allow them to do so.
I am therefore satisfied, on the basis of the above an analysis, that neither the relevant information at pages 38-40 of Category A, record 11, nor Category D, record 89, are exempt from release under section 30(1)(a) of the FOI Act.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby vary the HSE’s decision. I find that the HSE was justified under section 37 in refusing access in whole or part to the records that it withheld under that provision of the FOI Act, with the exception of page 26 of Category A, record 7 (save for a reference to an identifiable individual, which it was entitled to withhold), and I direct the release of this information. I also find that the HSE was not justified under either section 37 or section 30(1)(a) in withholding pages 38-40 of Category A, record 11, and I direct the release of this material. Finally, I find that the HSE was not justified under section 30(1)(a) in withholding Category D, record 89, and I direct its release.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated by the requester not later than eight weeks after notice of the decision was given, and by any other party not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given.
Neill Dougan
Investigator