Decision
Ms X and St. Vincent's University Hospital
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-159727-V8S0W1
Published on
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-159727-V8S0W1
Published on
Whether SVUH was justified in refusing access, under section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act, to the bye laws permitting clamping at the hospital on the basis that no such records exist.
12 August 2025
On 1 November 2024, the applicant made a complaint to SVUH about being clamped in one of its carparks. During the course of communications with the Hospital, the applicant sought a copy of the bye laws which permit clamping at the hospital.
On 9 December 2024, the applicant requested an internal review of SVUH’s deemed refusal of her request as SVUH had not issued a decision on her request within the statutory timeframe provided in the FOI Act. On 13 May 2025, the applicant applied to this Office for review of the matter as SVUH had not responded to her internal review request. This Office contacted SVUH about its failure to issue an internal review decision to the applicant and on 12 June 2025 SVUH wrote to the applicant explaining its position on her request. SVUH said that after conducting a thorough search, it has no bye laws. It refused the applicant’s request under section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act as the records sought do not exist or cannot be located. SVUH said that it operates under NTA rules which allows it to operate clamping on public and private sites in accordance with the rules of the site. On 12 June 2025, the applicant sought a review by this Office of SVUH’s decision.
During the course of this Office’s review, the Investigating Officer provided the applicant with details of SVUH’s submissions in which it outlined its reasons for concluding that relevant records do not exist. The Investigating Officer invited the applicant to make submissions on the matter. No reply was received.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the correspondence outlined above and to the submissions made by SVUH in support of its decision. I have decided to conclude this review by way of a formal, binding decision.
This review is concerned solely with whether SVUH was justified, under section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act, in refusing the applicant’s request for a copy of the bye laws which permit clamping at the hospital.
Section 15(1)(a) of the Act provides for the refusal of a request where the records sought do not exist or cannot be found after all reasonable steps to ascertain their whereabouts have been taken. The role of this Office in a case such as this is to review the decision of the FOI body and to decide whether that decision was justified. This means that I must have regard to the evidence available to the decision maker and the reasoning used by the decision maker in arriving at his/her decision and also must assess the adequacy of the searches conducted by the FOI body in looking for relevant records.
The evidence in “search” cases generally consists of the steps actually taken to search for the records along with miscellaneous and other information about the record management practices of the FOI body, insofar as those practices relate to the records in question. It is important to note that the FOI Act is concerned with access to records that a public body holds as opposed to records that a requester considers ought to exist.
In its submissions to this Office, SVUH said that the car park in question is under its remit. SVUH said that the requested bye laws do not exist. It stated that the SVUH site is considered private property under national legislation and that parking at SVUH is regulated under the Vehicle Clamping Act 2015 and overseen by the National Transport Authority (NTA), not under local council bye laws. Details of the NTA’s responsibilities in regard to the regulation of clamping activities and investigation of complaints is available on the NTA’s website.
As noted above, the applicant did not respond when invited to comment on SVUH’s submissions. Having regard to the information before this Office, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I am satisfied that SVUH has explained the legislative basis under which it operates clamping at the hospital. I have no reason dispute its position that it is regulated under the Vehicle Clamping Act 2015 and not under local council bye laws.
It is important to note that this Office has no remit to investigate complaints, or to adjudicate on how FOI bodies perform their functions generally, or to act as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism with respect to actions taken by FOI bodies. Having considered the matter carefully, I am satisfied that SVUH has adequately explained why the bye laws requested by the applicant in this case do not exist. In the circumstances, I find that SVUH was justified in refusing the applicant’s request under section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act on the ground that no such records exist.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby affirm SVUH’s decision to refuse the applicant’s request under section 15(1)(a) of the Act.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
____________________
Richard Crowley
Investigator